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Abstract
We develop a dynamic model where each generation in a family …rm can continue
operating its inherited production technology or it could hire a professional to do the
same. Though the professional is more quali…ed, his interests are not aligned with
the interests of the family. In the context of an overlapping generations framework,
we analyze how this tradeo¤ a¤ects the evolution of the family …rm. We …nd that
family …rms initially grow in size by accumulating capital and later professionalize
their management after reaching a critical size.
Today we take the notion of professional management – the idea that there can
be an individual with special skills whose responsibility is to manage – as granted.
Corporations, big and small, annually employ millions of professional managers. Busi-
ness schools, which codify management education, graduate more than 70,000 MBAs
and prompt about a quarter of a million to take the GMAT (Graduate Management
Admission Test) every year.
Yet, only a hundred years ago, professional management was an alien concept. As
no systematic studies of work and organizations existed before Frederick W. Taylor’s
1895 paper, “A Piece Rate System”, no one then could even conceive that manage-
ment would one day be a profession. History had shown that an individual became
a manager largely because of ownership, rank or power. Priests were managers in
Mesopotamia around 3000 B.C., viziers and judges were managers in the Middle East
around 1750 B.C., bureaucrats were managers in China around 1000 B.C., brahmins
were managers in India around 300 B.C.1 In modern times, after the Industrial Rev-
olution, entrepreneurs became the managers. When that was not possible, they
promoted workers from the lower ranks, or used relatives in managerial positions.
According to Drucker (1977), “In the society of 1900 the family still served in every
single country as the agent of, and organ for, most social tasks . . . Management, as
a speci…c discipline, as a speci…c kind of work, as a speci…c function in society and
economy, was developed almost entirely, within the past …fty years.”2
The development of professional management, however, has been vastly di¤erent
in the various regions of the world. Developed countries have more professional
managers than developing countries; bigger …rms hire more professional managers
than smaller …rms. Interestingly, even in the developed countries, management by
family is still an important feature: family businesses account for 40 percent of U.S.
GDP and 60 percent of its workforce; 66 percent of German GDP and 75 percent of
its workforce; and around 50 percent of Britain’s workforce.3 Burkart, Panunzi and
Shleifer (2003), citing a number of recent studies on this subject, begin their paper
unequivocally: “Most …rms in the world are controlled by their founders, or by the
founders’ families and heirs.”
1Chanakya Kautilya (332-298 B.C.), a feared minister to King Chandragupta Maurya, formalized
Indian public administration in his treatise Arthasastra.
2See also Wren (1979).
3The Economist, October 5, 1996.
1
The purpose of this paper is to construct a dynamic model to analyze how the
trade-o¤ between hiring an insider with aligned interests (a family member or crony)
and hiring a more productive outsider with non-aligned interests (a professional)
a¤ects the evolution of …rm management. This paper is complementary to our ear-
lier paper, Bhattacharya and Ravikumar (2001), where we assume that the insider
manages the …rm, but study the evolution of capital from inside ownership to outside
ownership. This paper is also complementary to Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003),
who explore cross-sectional implications of the same trade-o¤ in a static model.
The tension between insiders and outsiders in a modern corporation was …rst rec-
ognized by Berle and Means (1932). The agency literature, which formalized some
of their insights, began with the papers of Berhold (1971), Ross (1973), Heckerman
(1975), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Mirrlees (1976). In this literature, a person
(the principal) hires another person (the agent) to perform some service. The princi-
pal knows that the agent has a di¤erent objective and he also knows that he cannot
perfectly observe some facet of the agent that is relevant to the service (like ability,
or e¤ort). The problem is to design an optimal contract given these constraints.
The principal-agent literature assumes that another agent is essential to perform
the service. Our paper, on the other hand, drops this assumption – a principal can be
his own agent. That is, the twist in our model is the question, should the principal
(or equivalently, his crony) work himself, or should he hire a smart agent with an
appropriate contract. A distinguishing feature of our paper is that it embeds this
twist of the principal-agent framework in an overlapping generation model. This
allows us to characterize the evolution of …rm management over time from cronies to
professionals.
Our model is an overlapping generations version of the family-business model
of Bhattacharya and Ravikumar (2001). A younger generation, which lives for two
periods, inherits a small business with a constant returns to scale technology. Output
is produced using capital and labor – the family’s or a professional manager’s. When
the generation has become old, it divides the output between own consumption,
bequest to the next generation and, if an agent was hired, wage payments. Each
generation is concerned not only with the utility it derives from consumption when
it is old, but also with the bequest it leaves to the next generation.
The critical decision faced by the younger generation is whether to operate the
family business or to hire a professional. If the generation decides to work itself, there
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is no uncertainty with respect to the e¤ort put in or the output that is observed. If
a professional is hired as a manager, there is uncertainty with respect to the profes-
sional’s e¤ort level as well as uncertainty with respect to the generated output. The
professional is more productive than the family. The key idea here is that though the
professional is more productive, his interests are not aligned with those of the family.
We analyze the case where there is no external …nancing for the capital input to
production. Our key result is the following. Despite the fact that the productivity of
the professional manager dominates the productivity of the family, the family chooses
to professionalize the management only after the …rm reaches a critical size. For the
outsider to work hard, his participation constraint (he does not prefer another job)
and his incentive compatibility constraint (he has the right incentives to work hard)
need to be satis…ed. The family will hire a manager and bear these costs only if the
bene…t from doing so – emanating from the manager’s superior ability – exceeds the
costs. While the participation constraint acts like a …xed cost, our result holds even
when the participation constraint is not binding.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we lay out the optimization
problem faced by the younger generation. In Section 2, we analyze the case where
external …nancing is not available. We obtain the su¢cient conditions for profession-
alization, and determine the threshold level of capital at which professionalization
takes place. The main results of the paper are presented in this section. Section 3
concludes with a discussion of the limitations of the paper and suggestions for future
research.
1 The Model
Consider an overlapping generation of families that are altruistic. Time is discrete
starting from 0 and is indexed by t. We will refer to the family in generation t as
family t. Family t cares about the next generation; speci…cally, it leaves positive
bequests for family t + 1. Each family’s preferences are described by
u(c) + u(b) ¡ e,
where c is the family’s consumption, b is the bequest it leaves for the next generation,
and e is the labor e¤ort put forth by the family. We will assume that u(¢) is increasing
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and strictly concave with u(0) = 0 and u0(z) ! 1 as z ! 0.
The family’s e¤ort can take on one of two values: 0 or 1. Each family may produce
output, y, by exerting managerial e¤ort 1 using a technology, y = ag(k), where k is
the capital stock at the beginning of the period, a > 0, and g(¢) is increasing and
concave with g(0) = 0. If the family exerts e¤ort 0 then the family’s output is 0.
Instead of exerting e¤ort, the family may hire a professional manager to produce
output with a technology characterized by a stochastic marginal product of capital.
The manager’s e¤ort is either 0 or 1 and is private information. Given the manager’s
e¤ort, the output may be high or low, yH or yL respectively. We assume
yH = (a + ±)g(k),
yL = ag(k),
where ± > 0. Note that the manager’s productivity is not less than that of the family
even when he exerts 0 e¤ort.
Even though his e¤ort is not observable by the family, it knows the link between
the manager’s e¤ort and the stochastic output. If the manager’s e¤ort is 0 then the
output is yL with probability µ and yH with probability 1¡µ; if his e¤ort is 1 then the
output is yH with probability µ and yL with probability 1¡µ, where µ > 12. Thus, high
output is more likely when the manager’s e¤ort is high than when his e¤ort is low.
The output is observable by the family as well as by the manager. The manager’s
preferences are the same as the family’s and his outside option is completely described
by a utility level vm.
The timing of events in each period is as follows. The family begins with k units of
capital and it must decide whether to manage on its own or to hire a professional. If it
hires a professional manager, then the family promises a compensation package. The
manager chooses his level of e¤ort and then the output is realized. After seeing the
output, the family delivers the promised compensation and divides the rest optimally
between consumption and bequest. If the family manages the …rm, then the only
decision for the family is the consumption-bequest decision. The bequest is precisely
the stock of capital that the next generation begins with. The stock of capital for
generation 0 is assumed to be given.
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1.1 Self versus professional management
Since the family’s marginal utility is in…nite when its consumption is zero, its optimal
e¤ort is 1 if it chooses to manage on its own. Given k units of capital, the family’s
problem is then given by
max
c;b
u(c) + u(b) ¡ 1
subject to c+ b = ag(k):
Clearly, the optimal choice is c = b = 12ag(k). Thus, the family’s utility under self
management is
uf(k) = 2u(1
2
ag(k)) ¡ 1: (1)
Since the manager’s e¤ort is not observable, to ensure that the manager puts
forth the high e¤ort the family has to design its compensation package such that the
manager has the right incentives. Let wH be the payment to the manager when a
high output is observed and wL be the payment when a low output is observed. Since
the manager’s preferences are the same as the family’s, his indirect utility under high
e¤ort will be similar to (1). De…ne the indirect utilities, when the manager puts in
high e¤ort as v(wL) ´ 2u(12wL) ¡ 1 and v(wH) ´ 2u(12wH) ¡ 1. With this notation
the indirect utilities when the manager puts in the low e¤ort are given by v(wL) + 1
and v(wH) + 1, respectively. The incentive compatibility constraint that induces him
to put forth a high e¤ort is given by:
µv(wH) + (1¡ µ)v(wL) ¸ (1¡ µ) fv(wH) + 1g+ µ fv(wL) + 1g : (2)
In addition to the incentive compatibility constraint, the family has to ensure that
its compensation package dominates what the manager can get elsewhere, i.e., the
manager’s expected utility from the compensation package cannot be less than vm.
This participation constraint is given by
µv(wH) + (1 ¡ µ)v(wL) ¸ vm. (3)
We are implicitly assuming here that after having hired the manager, the family
would always want him to put in the high e¤ort. We will provide su¢cient conditions
later for this to be the case.
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The family’s problem, conditional on inducing the manager to put in the high
e¤ort, is to
Uf (k) ´ max
cH ;bH ;cL;bL ;wH ;wL
µ fu(cH) + u(bH)g+ (1¡ µ) fu(cL) + u(bL)g
subject to (2), (3),
cH + bH = (a+ ±)g(k) ¡ wH , and
cL + bL = ag(k)¡ wL.
Recall that the family’s e¤ort is 0 when it hires a manager. It is easy to see that the
decision rule for the family is as follows. Given k units of capital, if Uf (k) ¸ uf(k),
then the family would hire the manager. Otherwise, self-management is better.
There is another possible scenario that the family may …nd itself in: since the
manager’s productivity is higher than that of the family even when he is not working
hard, the family may want to hire him but not o¤er the incentives to work hard. In
this case, the incentive compatibility constraint (2) is irrelevant, so the family would
set wH = wL = w. Clearly, the family would o¤er the lowest possible w such that the
manager is induced to participate in the contract, i.e., (3) implies v(w)+1 = vm. The
family’s utility then is 2(1 ¡ µ)u¡12(yH ¡ w)¢ + 2µu¡12(yL ¡ w)¢. For this scenario
not to occur, we have to ensure that
Uf (k) ¸ 2(1 ¡ µ)u
µ
1
2
(yH ¡ w)
¶
+2µu
µ
1
2
(yL ¡ w)
¶
. (4)
That is, given k units of capital, the family is better o¤ making the manager work
hard than not making him work hard.
1.2 Moral hazard and the optimal contract
To determine the optimal compensation package that the family would o¤er to the
manager, it is useful to know the set of feasible (wH , wL) that satisfy (2) and (3). To
this end, rewrite the two equations as
v(wH) ¸ v(wL) + 12µ ¡ 1, (5)
v(wH) ¸ v
m
µ
¡ 1 ¡ µ
µ
v(wL). (6)
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It is easier to visualize these constraints in the utility space instead of the usual (wL,
wH) space. Speci…cally, consider Figure 1 where v(wH) is plotted as a function of
v(wL). The origin in Figure 1 is (0; 0) since the manager can achieve a utility level of
0 by not participating i.e., c = b = e = 0. Thus, the range of relevant outside options
are vm ¸ 0; the vertical intercept for (5) is 12µ¡1 and that for (6) is v
m
µ . In Figure
1, the manager’s utility is increasing as we move northeast and the family’s utility is
declining.
As illustrated in Figure 1 there are two possible con…gurations for the constraints.
First, consider panel a where v
m
µ · 12µ¡1 i.e., the participation constraint (6) does not
bind. In this case, the optimal contract is given by
2u(
1
2
wH) =
1
2µ ¡ 1 and wL = 0. (7)
Second, v
m
µ >
1
2µ¡1 in which case the optimal contract has to lie in the line segment
AB (see Figure 1, panel b). To determine whether the optimal contract is given by A
or B or some point in between, we need to know the slope of the family’s indi¤erence
curves in this space. To this end, it is useful to examine the family’s decision in the
(wL, wH) space.
Consider Figure 2 where the incentive compatibility and the participation con-
straints are illustrated in the (wL, wH) space. The slope of the participation con-
straint (6) is ¡ ¡1¡µµ ¢ v0(wL)v0(wH ). Since the marginal utility is 1 at 0, the slope of the
participation constraint is ¡1 at A and increasing as we increase wL. The slope of
the incentive compatibility constraint (5) is v
0(wL)
v0(wH) ; thus, the slope is positive and is
equal to +1 when wL is 0.
The family’s utility is given by
U f = 2µu
µ
1
2
(yH ¡ wH)
¶
+ 2(1 ¡ µ)u
µ
1
2
(yL ¡ wL)
¶
.
Thus, the slope of the family’s indi¤erence curve is ¡ ¡1¡µµ ¢ u0(12(yL¡wL))u0(12 (yH¡wH)) . Clearly, the
slope is …nite at A; so the optimal contract cannot be the compensation A. If the
point of tangency between the indi¤erence curve and the participation constraint is
not in the segment AB, then the optimal contract is the compensation B; if not, the
optimal contract is the point of tangency. The point of tangency is a solution to the
participation constraint (6) and
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v0(wL)
v0(wH)
=
u0
¡
1
2(yL ¡ wL)
¢
u0
¡1
2(yH ¡ wH)
¢ ,
or
u0( 12wL)
u0(12wH)
=
u0
¡
1
2 (yL ¡ wL)
¢
u0
¡1
2(yH ¡ wH)
¢ . (8)
The question now is whether this solution lies in the segment AB.4
The intersection point B is obviously the solution to (5) and (6), i.e.,
v(wL) = vm ¡ µ2µ ¡ 1; v(wH) = v
m +
1¡ µ
2µ ¡ 1. (9)
Without further restrictions on the utility function and the production technology, it
is di¢cult to ascertain whether the optimal contract is in the interior of the segment
AB or at B. The optimal contract is summarized in the lemma below.
Lemma 1 In order to induce the manager to work hard, the family o¤ers him the
following (wL; wH) contract: (i) when the participation constraint is not binding, the
contract is given by (7), (ii) when the participation constraint is binding, the contract
is given by either (9) or the solution to (6) and (8).
Lemma 1 helps us determine whether it is worthwhile for the family to hire the
manager and induce him to put forth a high e¤ort. In the next section, we use
Lemma 1 to examine the evolution of the …rm from self-management to professional
management.
2 Evolution of Management
In this section we will restrict attention to speci…c functional forms. Let u(z) =
1¡ e¡z, so u(¢) is increasing and strictly concave with u(0) = 0. Let g(k) = k. Since
the marginal utility is not 1 as z ! 0, there is no guarantee that the family would
ever engage in production. That is, we need to make sure that the family’s utility
with positive output exceeds its utility with zero output. Under self-management,
when the family exerts e¤ort 1 it is easy to see that
4For the CRRA class of preferences, equation (8) simpli…es to wLwH =
yL¡wL
yH¡wH , so
wL
wH
= yLyH =
a
a+± .
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uf(k) = 2(1¡ e¡12yL) ¡ 1. (10)
When its e¤ort is 0, its utility is 0. To preclude the possibility that the family will
exert 0 e¤ort, we want 2(1 ¡ e¡12yL) ¡ 1 ¸ 0, or yL ¸ 2 log(2). For the moment let
us assume that the initial capital, k0, exceeds 2log(2)a , so the linear technology implies
that the inequality is satis…ed in period 0. We will also assume that a > 2, so the
bequest, 12ak, exceeds k and, hence, the capital stock of generation t + 1 is greater
than the capital stock of generation t. Thus, starting from k0, the inequality is always
satis…ed under self-management.
2.1 Case 1: The participation constraint does not bind
Recall that the participation constraint (6) does not bind when vm 2 [0; µ2µ¡1]. In
this case, the optimal contract when hiring a manager and inducing him to put forth
a high e¤ort, according to Lemma 1, is
2(1 ¡ e¡12wH ) = 1
2µ ¡ 1 and wL = 0
or
e¡
1
2wH =
4µ ¡ 3
4µ ¡ 2 and wL = 0. (11)
Note that the contract makes sense only when µ > 34. When would the family want
to enter into such a contract with the manager? The answer to this question, given
k units of capital, depends on the family’s utility under the contract, Uf(k), versus
its utility under self-management, uf(k). Now,
Uf(k) = 2µ(1¡ 4µ ¡ 2
4µ ¡ 3e
¡ 12yH) + 2(1¡ µ)(1¡ e¡ 12yL). (12)
As noted earlier, the family would hire the manager when Uf(k) ¸ uf(k).
Before we examine the above inequality, we want to ensure that the family is
better o¤ under this contract than hiring a manager and not inducing him to work
hard. We do so in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Assume that the participation constraint does not bind. De…ne
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bk ´ 2
±
log
(
µ4µ¡24µ¡3 ¡ (1 ¡ µ) 22¡vm
µ 22¡vm ¡ (1¡ µ)
)
.
If k ¸ bk and if the family hires a manager, then it will induce him to work hard.
Proof. As noted in the previous section, it su¢ces to check whether the following
condition holds:
µ(1¡ 4µ ¡ 2
4µ ¡ 3e
¡12 yH) + (1¡ µ)(1¡ e¡ 12yL) ¸ (1¡ µ)(1¡ e¡12(yH¡w)) + µ(1¡ e¡ 12(yL¡w)),
where 2(1¡ e¡ 12w) = vm (see the derivation of (4)). Substitute for w and simplify the
above inequality to
µ
2
2 ¡ vm ¡ (1 ¡ µ) ¸
½
µ
4µ ¡ 2
4µ ¡ 3 ¡ (1¡ µ)
2
2¡ vm
¾
e¡
1
2(yH¡yL)
or,
e
1
2±k ¸
(
µ 4µ¡24µ¡3 ¡ (1 ¡ µ) 22¡vm
µ 22¡vm ¡ (1¡ µ)
)
.
(For µ > 34, we can show that v
m < 2 and that the numerator and the denominator
on the right hand side are both positive, so bk is well de…ned.) The result follows
immediately.
Note that bk is very large for µ close to 34 and that bk decreases with vm. Now
we are in a position to determine conditions under which the family would hire the
manager.
Proposition 3 Assume that the participation constraint does not bind and that µ > 34
and k0 > max
n
2 log(2)
a ;bko. There exists a unique k¤ such that the family would hire
the manager and o¤er him the contract in Lemma 1 when it has k ¸ k¤, and the
family would manage the …rm itself when it has k < k¤.
Proof. Using (10) and (12), the inequality Uf (k) ¸ uf (k) may be simpli…ed as
1
2µ
+ e¡
1
2yL ¸ 4µ ¡ 2
4µ ¡ 3e
¡ 12yH .
Let ° ´ a+±a , so yH = °yL. Note that as yL ! 0, the left hand side ! 1 + 12µ and
the right hand side ! 4µ¡24µ¡3 . It is easy to show that the right hand side exceeds the
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left hand side for µ > 34 . For yL ! 1, the left hand side ! 12µ , while the right hand
side ! 0. Thus, Uf(k) < uf (k) for low yL while Uf (k) > uf(k) for high yL. Hence,
by continuity, 9k¤ such that Uf(k¤) = uf(k¤). Uniqueness follows from the fact that
Uf(k) ¡ uf(k) is monotonic. The threshold, k¤, is the solution to
1
2µ
+ e¡
1
2ak =
4µ ¡ 2
4µ ¡ 3e
¡12(a+±)k. (13)
We need to verify that k¤ exceeds max
n
2log(2)
a ;bko.
It is easy to see from (13) that as ± increases the threshold where the family would
hire the professional manager decreases. The family starts with capital k0, produces
output by managing the …rm itself and accumulates capital (assuming a > 2) till it
reaches k¤, and then hires a professional manager and o¤ers him the incentives to put
forth a high e¤ort.
2.2 Case 2: The participation constraint binds
In this case, vm > µ2µ¡1 and the optimal contract lies in AB (see Figure 2). The
family’s utility when hiring the professional manager and inducing him to work hard
is now given by
Uf(k) = 2µ(1¡ e¡ 12(yH¡wH)) + 2(1¡ µ)(1¡ e¡ 12(yL¡wL)). (14)
The family’s utility under self-management is the same as in Case 1 (see (10)). To
determine the stock of capital at which Uf(k) ¸ uf(k), we need to know the optimal
(wH ; wL). It is easy to see from Figure 2 that the shape of the family’s indi¤erence
curves pin down where the optimal contract is in the segment AB. Equation (8) in
the previous section describes the points where the slope of the indi¤erence curve is
equal to the slope of the participation constraint. For the exponential utility this
reduces to wH ¡ wL = 12(yH ¡ yL) or
wH ¡ wL = 12 ±k. (15)
In the (wL; wH) space, this tangency condition is nothing but the 45-degree line
with intercept 12 ±k. The intersection between this line and the participation constraint
tells us where the optimal contract is in the segment AB. The participation constraint
for the exponential utility is
11
µe¡
1
2wH + (1¡ µ)e¡ 12wL · 1¡ v
m
2
. (16)
Denote the solution to (15) and (16) as the ordered pair (wL; wH) ´ w.
Now consider the intersection of the participation constraint and the incentive
compatibility constraint in Figure 2. The incentive compatibility constraint for the
exponential utility is given by
e¡12wL ¡ e¡12wH ¸ 1
4µ ¡ 2 . (17)
Let B, the solution to (16) and (17), be described by (wL; wH) ´ w. Let k be given by
wH ¡wL = 12±k. Similarly, the point A is given by wL = 0 and µe¡ 12wH +1¡µ = 1¡v
m
2 .
Let the associated capital according to (15) be k. Then, we have the following result.
Lemma 4 Assume that the participation constraint binds. If k 2 (0; k], then the
optimal contract is w. If k 2 (k; k), then the optimal contract is w. If k ¸ k, then
the optimal contract is given by wL = 0 and µe¡
1
2wH + 1¡ µ = 1¡vm2 .
Proof. See Figure 2.
According to the above lemma, unlike Case 1, the contract changes with the level
of capital when the participation constraint binds. For low levels of capital, the gap
between wage in the high state and wage in the low state is small. For higher levels of
capital this gap increases, …nally resulting in 0 wage for the low state. It remains to
be veri…ed whether the contract in Lemma 4, given the level of capital, is better than
the one where the family hires the manager but does not induce him to put forth the
high e¤ort.
We will next use Lemma 4 to determine the threshold level of capital when the
participation constraint binds.
Proposition 5 Assume that the participation constraint binds. There exists a unique
k¤ above which the family would hire the manager and o¤er him the contract in Lemma
4 and below which the family would manage the …rm itself.
Proof. Existence and uniqueness of k¤ is proven along the same lines as Proposition
3.
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3 Concluding Remarks
This paper models a family business as a production technology that is bequeathed
from an older generation to a younger generation. The younger generation can con-
tinue operating its inherited production technology or it could hire a more able profes-
sional to do the same. If the generation decides to work itself, there is no uncertainty
with respect to the e¤ort put in or the output that is observed. If a professional is
hired as a manager, there is uncertainty with respect to the professional’s e¤ort level
as well as uncertainty with respect to the generated output. The professional’s e¤ort
level is private information. Our main result, when there is no external …nancing, is
the following. We …nd that, although the professional is more productive than the
insider, the professional is hired only after the business reaches a certain critical size.
Pollak (1985) laid out the transaction cost approach to families and households.
According to him, the advantages of family governance are right incentives (claims
on family resources), monitoring (physical proximity), altruism (love), and loyalty,
whereas the disadvantages of family governance are possibilities of family con‡ict,
slack discipline, lack of skill, and size limitation. Both our paper as well as the paper
by Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003) formally model the trade-o¤ between some of
the above advantages and disadvantages of the family as a …rm. A legitimate goal for
future research could be an attempt to model all the above advantages and disadvan-
tages of the family …rm, thus providing a comprehensive framework for interpreting
the voluminous empirical literature consisting of surveys and case studies on family
…rms.
Another goal for future research is to model the interaction between the family’s
decision to obtain outside capital and the family’s decision to hire outside labor. It is
our belief that the critical size at which a family …rm professionalizes its management
is smaller and is reached sooner if capital markets are more developed. The basis for
our belief rests on two observations. The …rst observation is casual empiricism. It
seems that countries with well-developed capital markets are also countries with a
larger proportion of professional managers. The second observation comes from an
intuition in our companion paper, Bhattacharya and Ravikumar (2001), where we as-
sumed inside labor, but studied the evolution of capital from inside capital to outside
capital. We found in that paper that if the terms of trade o¤ered by capital markets
to a family for its business becomes more attractive, the family business reinvests
13
more, grows faster, and cashes out sooner at a smaller size. Our intuition suggests
that the same should happen to professionalization of managers; the family would
want to hire more productive professional managers sooner so that the …rm could
avail of this attractive exit option sooner. A formal model with external …nancing
would allow us to verify our intuition.
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